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This study examined 3 visual strategies for timing the initiation of the landing flare based 
on perceptions of either: (i) a critical height above ground level; (ii) a critical runway 
width angle (Ψ); or (iii) a critical time-to-contact (TTC) with the runway. Visual displays 
simulated landing approaches with trial-to-trial variations in glideslope, lighting, and 
scene detail. Twenty-four participants (8 private pilots, 8 student pilots and 8 non-pilots) 
were instructed to initiate the flare when they perceived that their TTC with the runway 
(30 m wide by 840 m long) had reached a critical value of 2 seconds.  Our results 
demonstrated a significant effect of flight experience on flare timing accuracy and 








Effects of Scenery, Lighting, Glideslope and  
Experience on Timing the Landing Flare 
 To obtain a safe, smooth landing, pilots of fixed-wing aircraft must reduce their 
descent rate during the final stages of the landing approach (Grosz et al., 1995; Mulder, 
Pleijsant, van der Vaart, & van Wieringen, 2000). This is achieved by performing the 
landing flare manoeuvre.  While the flare is often regarded as a continuous manoeuvre, it 
actually has two distinct phases: flare initiation (or ‘leveloff’) followed by ‘roundout’ 
(Benbassat, Willams & Abramson, 2005).  Below we describe the situation facing a pilot 
landing a general aviation aircraft (e.g., a Cessna 152).  First, it is essential that the pilot 
make a well-timed decision to initiate the flare.  During this initial leveloff phase, the 
pilot typically sets the throttle to idle and simultaneously transitions the aircraft from a 
nose-down approach attitude to straight and level flight (by pulling backwards on the 
yoke or control wheel).  Then during the roundout phase, the pilot continues to adjust the 
aircraft so as to reach the desired (nose-high) landing attitude and descent rate at 
touchdown (Benbassat et al., 2005; Langewiesche, 1972).  If performed correctly, the 
flare manoeuvre should reduce the aircraft’s descent rate to acceptable levels {e.g., from 
around 3 m/s (591 ft/min) during the glide to 1 m/s (197 ft/min) or less on touchdown – 
Grosz et al., 1995} so that it settles gently on the main landing gear. 
 The landing flare is considered one of the most technically demanding aspects of 
piloting.  Both novice and expert pilots consistently rate the landing flare as one of the 
most difficult flight manoeuvres (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b). It has been 
conservatively estimated that 18% of all landing accidents in the USA between 1995 and 
2000 were due to problems with the landing flare (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b; 




Benbassat et al., 2005). In one questionnare study by Benbassat and Abramson (2002b), 
87% of the 134 US pilots sampled indicated that they used visual cues to time the 
initiation of the flare.  However, no consensus emerged as to which specific visual cues 
were required for a successful flare.  A more recent study by Benbassat et al. (2005) 
examined the landing flare in finer detail.  They had novice, intermediate and expert 
pilots rate the perceived difficulty of the leveloff and roundout phases of the flare.  
Suprisingly, many of the pilots were unclear as to the distinction between these two 
phases (including the experts).  When definitions were provided, their participants were 
found to rate both leveloff (“determining the aircraft height and beginning of the flare” 
pp. 193) and roundout (“increasing the angle of attack by raising the nose of the aircraft 
after the leveloff” pp. 193) as equally difficult. 
 The goal of the present study was to examine the visual cues that pilots could use to 
accurately time the initiation of the landing flare (i.e., leveloff).  Accurate timing of the 
leveloff phase is crucial.  If flare initiation is too late, then the aircraft will eventually 
make hard contact with the runway.  If it is too early, then the aircraft may level out at too 
high an altitude, which is also problematic because: (i) it increases the likelihood of long 
landings and runway overruns; and (ii) any further reduction in airspeed may cause the 
aircraft to stall and drop with excessive velocity (Grosz et al., 1995). While leveloff 
timing errors can be compensated for (to a degree) during roundout, it is clear from self-
reports and questionnaire studies that accurate flare timing is an essential skill for pilots 
to acquire and retain. 
 Three possible visual strategies for timing the initiation of the landing flare have been 
identified in the literature. First, pilots could initiate the landing flare when they perceive 




that they are at a critical height above ground level (AGL). The critical height AGL for 
the flare depends on several factors.  For example, the critical flare height might be 3 to 9 
m (10 to 20 ft) AGL for a small or light (i.e., general aviation) aircraft compared to 24 m 
(80 ft) AGL for a larger transport aircraft (Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b; Benbassat et 
al., 2005; Langewiesche, 1972).  In principle, the pilot’s perception of height in this 
situation could be based on a variety of visual cues including stereopsis (binocular 
disparity), size (familiar and relative size), horizon (height in the visual field), motion 
(motion parallax and optic flow), texture gradients (linear perspective and compression 
gradients), etc (Allison, Gillam & Vecellio, 2007; Benbassat & Abramson, 2002b; 
Benbassat, Abramson, & Williams, 2002; Cutting & Vishton, 1995; Langewiesche, 1972; 
Riordan, 1974). Importantly, scene depths, heights and ground slant are often 
misperceived in entry-level flight simulators (which utilise binocular viewing of 3-D 
displays on near 2-D screens without collimation - Pierce & Geri, 1998; Roscoe, 1979). 
Thus, if accurate flare timing requires veridical perceptions of scene layout (including 
height AGL), then systematic errors might occur when using such simulators. 
 As a second strategy, pilots could initiate the landing flare when the visual angle (Ψ) 
formed between the left and right edges of the runway at the aiming line reaches a critical 
value (see Figure 1).   The aiming line is a hypothetical line that lies at right angles to the 
runway alignment and passes through the pilot’s aimpoint (Mulder et al., 2000).  Because 
this strategy is based only on a visual angle, it should allow accurate flare timing 
performance even when scene depths, heights and slants are misperceived (e.g., during 
night landings or when using entry-level simulators).  However, this strategy should 
produce serious errors (at least initially) when applied to unfamiliar runways (e.g., if one 




used a critical Ψ angle value appropriate for a familiar, narrow runway, this would 
produce an early flare when landing on an unfamiliar wide runway; see Mertens, 1981; 
Mertens & Lewis, 1982). 
 Finally, pilots could initiate the landing flare when their perceived time-to-contact 
(TTC) with the runway reaches a critical value (Grosz et al., 1995; Lee, 1980; Mulder et 
al., 2000). TTC during landing is defined as “the time remaining to the moment that the 
wheels make contact with the runway if no pilot action is taken” (Mulder et al., 2000, p. 
294).  However, since the aircraft’s wheels are not visible, TTC is probably perceived by 
the pilot as the time remaining for him/her to make contact with the runway.  This TTC 
could be perceived indirectly (e.g., McLeod & Ross, 1983), either by dividing the pilot’s 
perceived distance to the aimpoint by the perceived approach velocity, or by dividing the 
pilot’s perceived height above ground by his/her perceived descent rate.  However, since 
human perceptions of absolute distance and absolute velocity can be highly error prone 
(e.g., Schiff, Oldak, & Shah, 1992; Scialfa, Guzy, Leibowitz & Garvey, 1991; Sidaway, 
Fairweather, Sekiya & McNitt-Gray, 1996), some theorists have argued that TTC must be 
perceived directly (i.e., without first estimating speed and distance).  One possibility is 
that TTC is calculated directly via the following ratio (known as optic tau – see Lee, 
1976; 1980): 
 Tau ≈ θ/(dθ/dt) [1] 
 One commonly studied TTC scenario is the perpendicular approach, where the 
observer moves along a straight line towards a frontoparallel surface, which in turn 
generates a global pattern of optic flow.  In such situations, the optical expansion is 
isotropic (see Figure 2A) and the θ term in this equation can be defined in several 




different ways, resulting in useful local and global tau-based information about TTC.  
Consider the situation facing an automobile driver approaching a truck stopped at a set of 
traffic lights.  In the case of global tau, θ would be defined as the instantaneous visual 
angle between the moving observer’s aimpoint (which coincides with the focus of 
expansion of the global optic flow) and any other visible point lying on the truck (Lee, 
1980; Tresilian, 1991).  In the case of local tau type 1, θ would be defined as the 
instantaneous angular distance between any two visible points on the rear of the truck 
(e.g., its left and right brake lights - Tresilian, 1991); and (iii) in the case of local tau type 
2, θ would be defined as the angular distance between the optical boundaries of the truck 
(e.g., its left and right sides - Lee, 1976; Tresilian, 1991).  In all three cases, dθ/dt refers 
to the instantaneous rate of change in these angular distances over time.  In this 
perpendicular approach situation, both local and global tau would provide accurate 
estimates of TTC that could in principle be used to safely approach and stop behind the 
truck1
 Importantly, Mulder et al. (2000) have argued that the local and global tau cues 
described above, are not appropriate for estimating TTC during an aircraft landing.  
These slanted landing approaches (along a straight line and towards a rectangular runway 
lying on a horizontal ground plane) generate asymmetrical patterns of optical expansion 
(see Figure 2B).  In this specific case, Mulder et al. showed that the tau equation only 
accurately specifies the TTC during landing when it is based on optical expansion which 
occurs along the aiming line.  From Figure 2B, we can see that TTC estimates based on 
the optical expansion of points lying above the aiming line should result in TTC 
underestimation (due to their slower rate of expansion), whereas TTC estimates based on 
.   




optical expansion of points lying below the aiming line should lead to TTC 
overestimation (due to their faster rate of expansion).  Mulder et al. derived a ‘restricted’ 
tau cue specifically for this landing situation, which was identical to the global tau cue 
described above, with one exception: it was based on the optical expansion between the 
aimpoint and any other point lying on the aiming line.  However, accurate estimates of 
TTC could in principle be provided in this situation by the optical expansion between any 
two points lying on the aiming line.  This ‘restricted’ local tau type 1 cue could be based 
on the expansion either between the two points where the aiming line intersects with the 
left and right edges of the runway, or between two points lying on the aiming line outside 
the runway boundaries, etc.  Importantly, perceptions of TTC based on restricted global 
or restricted local tau cues should improve when additional ground texture is provided 
along the aiming line, as this would enable multiple estimates of TTC. 
 The available evidence for the use of the three flare timing strategies outlined above is 
inconclusive.  Consistent with the critical perceived height strategy for flare timing, flight 
instructors and instruction manuals typically suggest that the flare should be initiated 
when the pilot judges that the plane has reached the appropriate height above the runway 
(e.g., Benbassat et al., 2005; Thom, 1994).  Interestingly, actual aircraft landings 
performed under monocular viewing conditions have been found to be as accurate as 
those performed under binocular viewing conditions (e.g., Grosslight, Fletcher, Masterton 
& Hagen, 1978; Lewis & Krier, 1969; Lewis, Blakeley, Masters & McMurty, 1973).  
Thus, if a perceived critical height strategy is involved in timing the flare, it appears that 
monocularly available height information must be sufficient for the successful 
execution/completion of this task (see also Benbassat & Abramson, 2002a). 




 Grosz et al. (1995) found little support for any of the three above-mentioned strategies 
in their flight simulator study, where three jet transport pilots actively controlled 126 
simulated landings from a distance of 5 km from the runway to touchdown.  Contrary to 
their predictions, they found that pilots did not initiate their flares at either a constant 
height above the runway, or a constant time before touchdown.  They explained the 
failure of the above theories to account for flare timing performance by proposing that the 
experienced pilots in their study primarily “wanted to make contact with the runway at a 
specific point” (Grosz et al., 1995, pp. 119).  They suggested that future studies should 
constrain the response task in order to test these different strategies in terms of more 
relevant criteria (e.g., reducing the descent rate on touchdown to safe levels). 
 In more recent research, Mulder et al. (2000) found mixed support for the proposals 
that flare timing is based on perceived runway width angle (Ψ) and perceived TTC based 
on tau. In their simulation study, non-pilot (as opposed to pilot) participants viewed 
schematic landing displays and simply pressed the space bar on the computer’s keyboard 
when they perceived that they should initiate an idealised pre-programmed flare.  
Interestingly, Mulder and his colleagues found that flare timing strategies appeared to 
change from being based on perceived runway width angle when only a runway outline 
was provided, to being based on perceived TTC when additional texture was provided 
along the aiming line.  This suggested that as the visual information about TTC became 








 The current study was aimed at examining these three visual strategies, each of which 
could in principle be used to accurately time the initiation of the landing flare.  We hoped 
to avoid some of the possible problems in the earlier Grosz et al. (1995) study, where the 
participant’s extensive flight experience and the active nature of the glideslope control 
task may have complicated the flare error data (which would have consisted of 
components due to both initiation and control error).  Instead we chose to focus 
exclusively on the initiation phase of the flare, which we examined using a passive flare 
timing task combined with performance feedback.  The actual TTC at the start of each 
landing simulation varied from trial-to-trial.  Participants were instructed to watch the 
simulation and only initiate a landing flare when they perceived that their TTC with the 
runway had reached 2 s (the critical TTC for all of the conditions tested in this 
experiment). Unlike the Mulder et al. (2000) study, we tested not only non-pilots, but also 
student pilots and private pilots.  The aim of testing these three groups of participants was 
to determine whether the different levels of flight experience had any influence on either 
their choice of flare timing strategy or their response accuracy using our highly 
constrained experimental task. 
  Prior to the experiment, participants in each of the three flight experience groups were 
trained extensively to recognise the critical 2 s time interval.  During the simulated 
landing approaches in the subsequent experimental trials, they pressed a mouse button to 
indicate that they perceived that the critical time had arrived to initiate the flare.  
Participants were then told whether they had flared too early or too late and by how many 
seconds, which should have allowed them to identify the critical TTC for this specific 
landing scenario (Gagnon, Fleury, & Bard 1988; Tresilian, 1995). 




 We examined flare timing performance: (i) for 3° and 6° glideslope approaches; (ii) 
with both day and night lighting conditions; and (iii) with or without 3-D buildings 
present.  While the actual TTC at the start of the trial depended on the simulated 
glideslope, the critical TTC was always 2 s and the critical runway width angle was 
always 23.5° for both of the glideslope conditions tested.  However, the critical heights 
AGL were different for the 3° (3.8 m) and 6° (7.5 m) glideslopes.  Thus, if participants 
used either a tau-based critical TTC or a critical runway width angle strategy, they should 
show no glideslope effects on their flare timing.  However, if they used either a non-tau 
based critical TTC strategy or a critical perceived height strategy, their data should 
display significant glideslope effects on flare timing - which might be more marked 
during night lighting conditions without 3-D buildings, because less depth/distance 
information would be available. Our predictions in terms of the other display 
manipulations (day versus night lighting and buildings versus no buildings) were as 
follows.  If participants were using a critical runway width angle strategy then we would 
expect that their performance would not be significantly altered by either manipulation, 
since the runway outline on which it was based was always visible.  Conversely, if 
accurate perception of the scene layout (including height AGL) was important, then 
displays which have day lighting and contain 3-D buildings should produce more 
accurate and consistent flare performance.  However, according to Mulder et al. (2000), 
similar effects might also be found if participants used a critical TTC strategy, because 
adding day lighting and 3-D buildings would increase the amount of texture along the 
aiming line, and would therefore provide more visual information for TTC (based on 
restricted tau). 








 Twenty-four males were paid for their participation in this study. Sixteen of these 
participants had flight experience and were recruited from NSWAir and the Australian 
Aerial Patrol Flight School located at Albion Park, New South Wales. There were eight 
student pilots, who had a mean age of 25.6 years (with a standard deviation of 6.9 years) 
and had accrued 23 flight hours on average (SD = 17.8). There were also eight private 
pilots with mean age of 38.4 years (with a standard deviation of 11.7 years) who had 
accrued 217 flight hours on average (SD = 63.8). The remaining eight participants were 
non-pilots - psychology graduate/undergraduate students at the University of Wollongong 
(mean age 24.8 years with a standard deviation of 6.5 years). All of the non-pilots, 
student pilots and private pilots in our study had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. 
 
Materials & Apparatus 
 Displays were generated by a Macintosh G5 personal computer and presented on a 
Samsung Trinitron SyncMaster monitor (37 cm wide x 27.5 cm high, with a pixel 
resolution of 1280 x 1024 and an 85 Hz refresh rate). A chin rest was used to align the 
participant’s eye level with the simulated location of the display’s true (implicit) horizon 
– this chin rest was located 45 cm in front of the 44.7° wide x 34.0° high display.  A 
follow-up questionnaire was given to student and private pilots to examine their 
perceptions of the landing flare – the items of which were taken from an earlier survey 




study by Benbassat and Abramson (2002b).  In this questionnaire, pilot participants rated 
the perceived difficulty of the landing flare compared to nine other standard flight 
manoeuvres (“steep turns”, “takeoff roll”, “holding altitude”, “climbing”, “descending”, 
“taxiing”, “coordinated turns”, “forward slip” and “landing roll”). They were also asked 
whether they relied on visual or other information (“instrument readings”, “gut reaction”, 
“sense of balance”, “other”) to initiate the landing flare. If participants responded that 
they used “vision” to initiate the flare, they were asked to indicate which of the following 
was the most important cue or information for flare timing (“shape of the runway” 
“runway markings”, “angle with the runway”, “horizon”, “familiar objects”, “motion 
parallax”, “descent rate”, or “other” cues). Finally, they were also asked to indicate the 
factors that they felt were responsible for their current successful landing flares (“pattern 
practice”, “natural ability”, “sheer luck”, “aviation books”, “my instructor”, “other”). 
 
Visual displays 
 Computer-generated displays simulated fixed-wing aircraft landing approaches under 
day or night lighting conditions (approach velocity was held constant in all cases at 130 
km/hr or 70 KIAS).  Each approach simulated either a 3º or 6º glideslope (producing a 
descent rate of either 1.9 m/s = 374 ft/min or 3.8 m/s = 748 ft/min), starting 30 m AGL 
and then progressing towards the rectangular red aimpoint marker lying on the runway.  
On 3° approaches the actual TTC with this aimpoint marker was 15.87 s at the start of the 
trial, whereas on 6° approaches the actual TTC at the start of the trial was 7.96 s.   The 
location of this aimpoint marker varied randomly from trial-to-trial, ranging 100 m to 250 
m from the start of the runway (starting distance was adjusted accordingly).  The runway 




was 30 m (or 100 ft) wide by 840 m (or 2755 ft) long, and was lined by 15 white lights 
placed in intervals of 60 m along each of the two long runway edges. Unlike other scene 
features in the display, there was no local change in the image size of either the runway 
lights or the red aimpoint marker during the simulated approach.  Both the aimpoint and 
the runway rested on a 1000 m (or 3281 ft) wide by 2000 m (or 6562 ft) deep flat ground 
plane. In half of the trials in this experiment, five buildings were placed in random 
locations on the left of the runway and five buildings were placed in random locations on 
the right of the runway (see Figure 3B).  Buildings ranged in height from 1 to 10 storeys 
(3 to 30 m. Typical aircraft hangars are approximately 6 m high), and in width from 24 to 
48 m. During night lighting conditions, only the red aimpoint marker, the white runway 
lights and the 3-D texture-mapped buildings (when present) were visible.  During day 
lighting conditions, the detailed textures of the runway tarmac and the surrounding 
ground plane surface were also visible (see Figure 3A).  In these day lighting conditions, 
the most distant parts of the ground plane were obscured by a simulated fog – the goal 
being to reduce the strength of the false visible horizon produced by the ground’s finite 
dimensions.  Specifically, at the beginning of the display this was located 0.86º below the 
true horizon and moved up the participant’s visual field as the viewpoint changed during 
the simulated descent. 
 
Procedure 
 Each participant went through three training phases prior to the main experiment. In 
the first training phase, participants were shown demonstration programs simulating an 
idealised preprogrammed flare, which was automatically initiated when the TTC with the 




ground (based on the constant velocity glide at 130 km/hr) reached 2 s.  Thus, for a 3° 
approach the flare was initiated 13.87 s after display onset, whereas for a 6° approach the 
flare was initiated 5.96 s after display onset.  After the flare had been initiated, the 
manoeuvre itself had an exponential trajectory and lasted 6 s (for the flare equation - see 
Mulder et al., 2000, pp. 303).  During each demonstration, participants were shown a 
real-time readout of both the simulated TTC and the simulated height AGL. In the second 
training phase, participants were simply required to time a 2 s interval.  No landing 
display was presented.  Only the following instructions were displayed on the monitor: 
“Press the space bar then the mouse button 2 s later”.  After each 2 s time interval was 
produced, written feedback was displayed on the monitor indicating the accuracy of the 
participants estimate (“too early” or “too late by … seconds”).  Participants had to 
produce this 2 s time interval a minimum of 10 times. In order to proceed onto the next 
training phase, participants had to produce an estimation error smaller than 0.5 seconds 
on 5 consecutive training trials.  In the third and final training phase, participants were 
exposed to both the computer generated landing displays and the flare timing task used in 
the main experiment.  Each participant ran one full block of 40 practice trials.  The details 
of this final training phase and the main experiment are described below. 
 In the main experiment, displays were blocked by scene type: 2 blocks used displays 
which contained no 3-D buildings (only the runway and the ground plane, the latter was 
visible only in day lighting conditions – see Figure 3A), whereas the remaining 2 blocks 
used displays which each contained ten visible 3-D buildings. Each of these blocks 
consisted of 40 trials simulating both 3º and 6º approaches during either night and day 
lighting conditions.  Four participants in each group (non-pilot, student pilot or private 




pilot) were randomly allocated to practice trial displays with 3-D buildings and 4 were 
randomly allocated to practice trial displays without 3-D buildings.  They were instructed 
that they always need to initiate the flare when they perceived that they were 2 s from 
touchdown.  Participants started a trial by pressing the spacebar on the keyboard and then 
later initiated the flare by pressing the mouse button.  In order to produce 0 s timing error, 
participants needed to initiate their flares when the TTC with the aimpoint was 2 s, which 
corresponded to a critical runway width angle (Ψ) of 23.5° or a critical distance to the 
aimpoint of 72 m (regardless of the angle of the linear approach).  However, if 
participants were using a critical height strategy, they needed to initiate their flare when 
they were at a height of 3.8 m AGL during 3° approaches or 7.5 m AGL during 6° 
approaches (as the descent rate was higher in the latter condition).  The display froze after 
each flare initiation and participants were immediately provided with written feedback on 
the display monitor about their flare initiation performance (“too early” or “too late by … 
seconds” – see Figure 1). After completing 40 practice trials, participants then ran the 4 
experimental blocks (all with performance feedback) in a random order.  There were 20 
replications of each scene by lighting by glideslope condition combination per 
participant. The experimental software was written so that data were only recorded for 
trials for which the frame rate remained above 60 Hz (“bad trials” were automatically 
retested later in the experiment).  On completion of the main experiment, participants 
performed 10 more runs on the Two second time interval estimation task without 
performance feedback.  The goal of this retest was to check whether there were group 
differences in the ability to time a 2 s interval (as opposed to a 2 s TTC).  When this task 




was completed, the non-pilot participants were dismissed from the study.  Student and 
private pilots were however still required to complete the landing flare questionnaire. 
 
Results 
Landing Flare Questionnaire Data 
 The results of our survey on 16 Australian aviators were found to closely replicate 
those of the Benbassat and Abramson (2002b) study, carried out on a much larger sample 
of 134 US aviators.  Consistent with the earlier study: (i) all but one of our 16 pilot 
participants rated the landing flare as the most difficult of the 10 standard flight 
manoeuvres (compared to steep turns, takeoff roll, holding altitude, climbing, descending, 
taxiing, coordinated turns, forward slip and the landing roll) and indicated that practice 
was the major contributing factor to recent successful flares; and (ii) all 16 pilot 
participants indicated that they used vision to initiate the landing flare (two of the private 
pilots and 2 student pilots chose gut reaction when given the opportunity to choose a 
second option).  Consistent again with the findings of the Benbassat and Abramson 
(2002b) study, little consensus emerged as to which specific visual cues were reported to 
be necessary for a successful landing. When given the opportunity to choose more than 
one item, multiple items were chosen by all of our pilot participants (see Figure 4).  For 
example, some chose runway based cues: “angle with the runway”, “end of the runway”, 
and “shape of the runway”, “runway markings”.  Others chose traditional monocular 
distance cues, such as “motion parallax”, “relative size”, “texture gradient”, “familiar 
size”, and “horizon” (note that “shape of the runway” is also a monocular distance cue).    
Possibly due to the priming inherent in the experimental instructions and training, one of 




the student pilots included “time-to-contact” under the “other” option.  Table 1 clearly 
illustrates the similarity of the current visual cue ratings to those of the Benbassat and 
Abramson (2002b) study, which in turn suggests that these visual cues are given similar 
emphasis during US and Australian flight training.  However, these survey results should 
still be interpreted with some caution since pilots might not be conscious or aware of the 
visual cues that they actually use to time the flare, and even if they are, they might still 
have difficulty expressing (or verbalizing) how this task is carried out. 
 
Two-second Time Interval Estimation Error Data 
  Before running the analyses on the data obtained in the experimental conditions, we 
checked for any group (non-pilot, student pilot and private pilot) differences in estimating 
a 2 s time interval (as opposed to a 2 s TTC).  We performed a Between-groups ANOVA 
on this 2 s time interval estimation data.  The main effect of group type failed to reach 
significance (F2,21 
 
= 1.01, p >  .05, Cohen’s ƒ = 0.31), indicating that non-pilots, student 
pilots, and private pilots produced similar errors when attempting to estimate a 2 s time 
interval. 
Flare Timing Error Data 
 A split-plot ANOVA was then performed on the mean flare timing error data. Group 
type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) was again the between subjects factor and 
there were three within subjects factors: scenery type (buildings or no buildings), 
glideslope type (3º or 6º), and lighting type (day or night). The results and statistics are 
shown in Table 2. We found a significant main effect of glideslope on flare timing errors. 




As can be seen in Figure 5, participants tended to initiate the flare too early (i.e., before 2 
s TTC) for 3º glideslope conditions and too late (i.e., after 2 s TTC) for 6º glideslope 
conditions.  While we did not find a significant main effect of group type, we did find a 
significant interaction between group type and glideslope.  From Figure 5, it can also be 
seen that all 3 types of participant (non-pilots, student pilots and private pilots) displayed 
the same tendencies to flare too early on 3º approaches and too late on 6° approaches. 
However, these biases were markedly larger for the non-pilots compared to the student 
and private pilots. 
 We also found a significant main effect of scene type on flare timing errors, indicating 
that visual displays which contained 3-D buildings produced less flare timing error than 
those without buildings (see Figure 6).  While the main effect of lighting did not reach 
significance, we did find a significant interaction between scene type and lighting type.  
We interpreted this finding as indicating that the presence of 3-D buildings in the display 
reduced flare timing error more during simulated night lighting conditions than during 
simulated day lighting conditions (see Figure 6). No other main effects or interactions 
reached significance. 
 
Runway Width Angle (Ψ) at Flare 
 A 3 (Group type) x 2 (Scene type) x 2 (Lighting type) x 2 (Glideslope type) split-plot 
ANOVA was also performed on the mean runway width angle Ψ at flare data. The results 
and statistics are shown in Table 3.  We found a significant main effect of glideslope on 
the runway width angle at flare. While the critical runway width angle was 23.5º for both 
of the glideslope conditions tested, participants were found to initiate the flare at smaller 




Ψ angles for 3º approaches (21.4º ± 9.5º) and larger Ψ angles for 6º approaches (27.5º ± 
9.6º).  While the main effect of group type on runway width angle at flare was not 
significant, the interaction between group type and glideslope was significant.   From 
Figure 7 we can see that the biasing effect of glideslope on the runway width angle at 
flare was greater for the non-pilots than for the student or private pilots. 
 Interestingly, we also found a significant main effect of lighting on runway width 
angle at flare, which was not evident in the flare timing data.  Specifically, the mean Ψ 
angle at flare was 22.91° ± 6.75° during day simulations compared to 26.01° ± 12.29° 
during night simulations.  This demonstrates that the actual Ψ angle chosen at flare was 
closer to the ideal Ψ angle at flare (of 23.5°) during day lighting conditions.  Unlike the 
flare timing error data, neither the main effect of scene type, nor the interaction between 
scene type and lighting type reached significance for the runway width angle data.  
However, it should be noted that while TTC at flare and runway width angle at flare were 
highly related in this experiment, their relationship was non-linear, which could account 
for the observed differences between these two data sets.    No other main effects or 
interactions reached significance. 
 
Height AGL at flare 
 A 3 (Group) x 2 (Scene type) x 2 (Lighting type) x 2 (Glideslope type) split-plot 
ANOVA was also performed on the mean height AGL at flare data. The results and 
statistics are shown in Table 4.  We found a significant main effect of glideslope type on 
the height AGL at flare. As can be seen from Figure 8, non-pilots, student pilots and 
private pilots correctly initiated their flares at lower heights AGL for 3º glideslopes (M = 




4.76 m; S.D. = 2.08 m) and at higher heights AGL for 6° glideslope conditions (M = 6.96 
m; S.D. = 1.96 m). While we did not find a significant main effect of group type, we did 
find a significant interaction between group type and glideslope. From Figure 8, it can 
also be seen that the flare heights selected by student pilots (4.2 ± 1.1 m for 3° 
glideslopes; 7.1 ± 1.8 m for 6° glideslopes) and private pilots (4.6 ± 1.7 m for 3°; 7.3 ± 
1.9 m for 6°) were much closer to the actual critical heights for our ideal flares (3.8 m for 
3°; 7.5 m for 6°) than those selected by the non-pilots (5.3 ± 2.8 m for 3°; 6.4 ± 2.1 m for 
6°).  
 While the main effects of lighting type and scene type did not reach significance, we 
did find a significant interaction between scene type and lighting. The presence of 3-D 
buildings in the display was found to reduce the height AGL at flare more for night 
simulations than for day simulations.  This general reduction in flare heights improved 
task performance in 3° glideslope conditions (as flare heights without buildings tended to 
be greater than the critical value of 3.8 m), but not for 6° glideslope conditions (as flare 
heights without buildings tended to be less than the critical value of 7.5 m). No other 
main effects or interactions reached significance. 
 
Discussion 
 Our study examined three different visual strategies that could be used to time the 
initiation of the landing flare, based on either a perceived critical TTC with the runway, a 
perceived critical runway width angle, or a perceived critical height AGL. Exclusive use 
of the critical runway width angle strategy should have led to accurate performance in all 
conditions tested, since the runway outline was always available.  However, contrary to 




this prediction, we found that the display lighting and building manipulations 
significantly influenced flare timing performance.  Flare timing accuracy was found to 
improve when landing simulations contained 3-D buildings.  However, the effects that 
these buildings had on performance depended on the display lighting: adding 3-D 
buildings to night lighting displays had a greater effect on flare timing performance than 
adding 3-D buildings to day lighting conditions. While these scene effects were generally 
consistent with the tau-based TTC strategy, where according to Mulder et al. (2000) 
performance should improve when ground texture is added along the aiming line, they 
were also consistent with the use of a perceived height/distance strategy.  Importantly, the 
runway width angle and tau-based TTC strategies both predicted that glideslope 
manipulations in the current experiment should have little effect on flare timing 
judgments because both the critical TTC (2 s) and the critical runway width angle (23.5°) 
were identical for the two glideslope conditions tested (3° and 6°).  Contrary to these 
predictions, all of our participants were found to flare too early during simulated 3° 
approaches and too late during simulated 6° approaches.  Since only the critical height 
AGL was altered by the simulated glideslope in this experiment (critical values were 3.8 
m for 3° approaches and 7.5 m for 6° approaches), the observed glideslope biases 
suggested that perception/misperception of height AGL influenced task performance.  
That is,  the results were most consistent with participants using a flare timing strategy 
based on either a critical perceived height or on an indirectly (i.e., not tau based) 
perceived critical TTC (e.g., the latter could be calculated by dividing the perceived 
height AGL by the perceived descent rate). 




 While all 3 types of participant flared too early/high during simulated 3° approaches 
and too late/low during simulated 6° approaches, these biases were significantly smaller 
for student and private pilots than for the non-pilots. One possible explanation for this 
finding might be that the non-pilots were simply less motivated to perform well than our 
student pilots and private pilots. Contrary to this notion, all three groups of participants 
were found to perform with similar levels of accuracy in the simple 2 s time interval 
estimation control task.  However, the flare timing task was more challenging than this 
time interval estimation task, potentially involving multiple perceptions (of runway width 
angle, height AGL, as well as TTC) and requiring the selection and calibration of 
successful strategies.  Also, unlike our non-pilot participants, the pilots would have been 
aware of the serious consequences of incorrectly timing the landing flare.  Thus, it is 
possible that differences in motivation might have been more evident with the flare 
timing task. 
 A far more likely (and interesting) explanation for the pilot performance advantage 
was that these results reflected the group differences in flight experience. As we noted in 
the introduction, our student and private pilot participants should have been primed to use 
a perceived critical height strategy due to their flight training and real world flight 
experience (where, unlike the situation in our simulation experiments, they would have 
typically been exposed to a full complement of depth/distance cues upon landing). Thus, 
they should have been able to quickly identify and calibrate this successful flare timing 
strategy and then use it exclusively from that point onwards.  Consistent with this notion, 
in an earlier flight simulation experiment, Grosz et al. (1995) found evidence that their 




highly trained commercial pilot participants were heavily biased towards initiating the 
flare at a particular height. 
 Our non-pilots appeared to have much more difficulty identifying a successful flare 
timing strategy.  We found that the flare heights chosen by non-pilots during 3° (5.32 ± 
2.87 m) and 6° approaches (6.46 ± 2.05 m) were actually closer to the mean of two the 
critical flare heights (i.e., 5.65 m) than to their respective critical values (of 3.8 m and 7.5 
m).  That is, their flare initiation performance demonstrated a strong a central tendency 
bias (e.g., Slack, 1953).  This non-pilot performance contrasted markedly with the student 
and private pilot performance, where the flare heights chosen during 3° (4.29 ± 1.15 m; 
4.67 ± 1.69 m) and 6° approaches (7.09 ± 1.87 m; 7.34 ± 1.85 m) were much closer to 
their respective critical flare heights than to the mean of these two values. Thus, it 
appears that the non-pilots were significantly more likely to develop a flawed flare timing 
strategy in which they initiated their flares at approximately the same height AGL for 
both glideslope conditions.  
 Research has shown that observers tend to respond earlier in TTC and collision control 
tasks when the speed of closure is slower (e.g., McLeod & Ross, 1983; Schiff, et al., 
1992; Smith, Flach, Dittman & Stanard, 2001).  Because both the starting height AGL 
(30m) and the approach velocity (130 km/hr) were held constant in the current 
experiment, the descent rate (or the vertical speed of closure with the ground) varied 
significantly with the glideslope (1.9 m/s for 3° approaches and 3.8 m/s for 6° 
approaches). This glideslope-based difference in descent rate could potentially explain 
the finding that non-pilots flared much earlier than they should have in 3° conditions (by 
on average 0.8 s compared to 0.4 s for pilots) and later than they should have in 6° 




conditions (by on average 0.3 s compared to 0.1 s for pilots).  If one ignored the presence 
of the two different approach angles (which participants were informed both had a critical 
TTC of 2 s), such a central tendency bias would have actually been reinforced by the 
performance feedback (“too early” or “too late”) provided across different trials. 
 Why then did the perceived critical height strategy dominate pilot flare timing 
responses in the current experiment?  In the earlier flare timing study, Mulder et al. 
(2000) found that non-pilot participants changed from using a critical runway width angle 
strategy to using the critical TTC strategy when additional texture was added to their 
landing displays.  They concluded that their non-pilots became more likely to adopt the 
critical TTC strategy as optic tau information became more reliable.  Analysis of the 
landing displays used in the current experiment suggests that pilots (and possibly non-
pilots to a lesser extent) might have been more likely to adopt the critical perceived 
height strategy because the optical splay angles formed by the left and right sides of the 
runway provided a reliable cue to height AGL for all of the conditions tested (Flach, 
Hagen, & Larish, 1992; Flach, Warren, Garness, Kelly, & Stanard, 1997).  Optical splay 
angle (S) can be defined as follows: 
 S = tan-1 (Yg
 Where Y
/Z)        [2] 
g is the lateral displacement of the left or right edge from the runway centre-
line and Z is the height AGL of the observer.  Since we used a 30 m wide by 840 m long 
runway for every landing simulation, runway splay angle information was directly related 
(in a non-linear fashion) to height AGL and this information was available during both 
day and night lighting conditions (in the case of the latter via the runway lights).  
Importantly, this runway splay angle cue is different to the runway width angle (ψ) cue 




outlined in the introduction.  While the former strategy would require participants to flare 
at different critical splay angles for each of the two approach angles (75.8° during 3° 
approaches and 63.4° during 6° approaches), the latter strategy would require participants 
to always flare when the angular width of the runway at the aimpoint reached 23.5°.  
Figure 9 shows the splay angle at flare data, which reveals very similar patterns of non-
pilot, student pilot and private pilot performance to those in height AGL at flare data.  
However, it is important to note that if we had used a variety of runways, each with 
different dimensions, this splay angle cue would have become less reliable, which might 
have forced participants to search for other flare initiation strategies (e.g., based on either 
other depth cues, a perceived critical TTC based on optic tau, a perceived critical angular 
width of the runway, or some other property of the dynamic visual display). 
 The lighting and scene effects observed in the flare timing data suggest that our pilot 
participants were actually responding to a perceived critical height AGL, not simply a 
perceived critical splay angle.  That is, optical splay angle appeared to be one of many 
cues that contributed to the overall percept of a critical height AGL.  Longuet-Higgins 
(1984) has previously noted that the scene layout information provided by visual motion 
of the runway lights is inherently ambiguous during an aircraft landing at night.  This 
optic flow can either be correctly interpreted as indicating an oblique approach towards a 
horizontal ground plane, or misperceived as pure descent relative to a nearly vertical 
planar surface.  Consistent with his analysis, many of our participants spontaneously 
reported strong illusions of both runway inclination and scene depth during night lighting 
conditions without buildings.  So it seems likely that adding 3-D buildings to our night 
lighting displays improved flare timing performance because they helped disambiguate 




the optic flow information about self-motion and the orientation of the runway and/or 
ground plane. However, it is notable that night lighting displays with 3-D buildings 
produced more accurate flare timing performance than day lighting displays (both with 
and without 3-D buildings).  It is possible that the higher than expected level of 
performance error found during day lighting was due to the false visible horizon formed 
in these conditions (located 0.86º below the true horizon at the beginning of the display).  
According to this argument, misleading information from the visible horizon biased 
participant perceptions of environmental distance and ground plane orientation during 
day lighting conditions (even when accurate information was provided by adding 3-D 
buildings to the displays); and these misperceptions of the environmental layout led to 
flare timing errors (e.g., participants might have flared too early when displayed distances 
were perceived to be smaller than were being simulated). 
 In conclusion, the findings of our flight simulation study demonstrate that perceived 
height can play an important role in timing the initiation of the landing flare.  In this 
experiment, pilot, and to a lesser extent non-pilot, flare timing performance were best 
explained by participant perceptions of height AGL.  There was no support for the use of 
the angular width of the runway at the aimpoint.  The findings were also clearly contrary 
to proposals that pilot timing and control of the landing flare could be based solely on 
direct perceptions of TTC via optic tau (e.g., Jump & Padfield, 2006; Padfield, Lee & 
Bradley, 2003).  Despite the strong support found in this study for the use of a height 
strategy, it is important to note that both the current landing simulations and the 
experimental task were highly constrained (in comparison to situations faced during 
actual landings).  Based on previous findings, it is unlikely that a single cue or strategy 




can account for landing flare performance (DeLucia, Kaiser, Bush, Meyer, & Sweet, 
2003; Grosz et al., 1995; Hancock & Manser, 1997; Mulder et al., 2000; Smith et al., 
2001; Tresilian et al., 2004).  It seems more likely that this perceived critical height based 
strategy dominated over TTC and other strategies in the current experiment, because the 
optical splay angle formed by the fixed runway in our displays provided a reliable cue to 
height AGL in all conditions tested.  Even so, it is worth noting that our pilot participants 
were more readily able to identify and adopt this height based strategy than the non-
pilots, which suggests that they were likely to employ such a strategy during actual flight.  
Thus, with the above qualifications in mind, the current findings provide a validation of 
current pilot training in the use of critical height AGL as an important cue for initiating 
the landing flare. 
 
 





Allison, R., Gillam, B, Vecellio (2007).  Binocular depth discrimination and estimation 
beyond interaction space.  Journal of Vision, 7, 817. 
Benbassat, D., & Abramson, C.I., (2002a).  General aviation landing flare instructions.  
The Journal of Aviation/Aerospace Education & Research, 15, 31-39. 
Benbassat, D., & Abramson, C.I., (2002b). Landing flare accident reports and pilot 
perception analysis. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 12, 137-
152. 
Benbassat, D., Abramson, C. I., & Williams, K. W. (2002). Comparative approach to 
pilot error and improper landing flares. International Journal of Comparative 
Psychology, 15, 249-255. 
Benbassat, D., Williams, K.W., & Abramson, C.I. (2005).  General aviation leveloff, 
roundout, and accident rate analysis.  The International Journal of Aviation 
Psychology, 15, 189-203. 
Cutting, J.E., & Vishton, P.M. (1995).  Perceiving layout and knowing distances: The 
integration, relative potency, and contextual use of different information about 
depth.  In W. Epstein & S. Rogers (Eds.), Perception of Space and Motion (pp. 69-
117).  New York: Academic Press. 
DeLucia, P.R., Kaiser, M.K., Bush, J.M., Meyer, L.E., & Sweet, B.T. (2003).  
Information integration in judgments of time-to-contact.  The Quarterly Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 56A, 1165-1189. 




Gagnon, M., Fleury, M., & Bard, C. (1988). Knowledge of results and spatial-temporal 
control in an anticipation task among 6- to 10-yr-old children. Canadian Journal of 
Psychology, 42, 347-363. 
Grosslight, J.H., Fletcher, H.J., Masterton, B. & Hagen, R. (1978). Monocular vision and 
landing performance in general aviation pilots:  Cyclops revisited. Human Factors, 
20, 27-33. 
Grosz, J., Rysdyk, R.T., Bootsma, R.J., Mulder, J.A., Van der Vaart, J.C., & Van der  
Wieringen, P.C.W. (1995). Perceptual support for timing of the flare in the landing 
of an aircraft. In J.M. Flach, P.A. Hancock, J.K. Caird, & K.J. Vicente (Eds.), Local 
applications of the ecological approach to human-machine systems (pp. 104-121), 
Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. 
Flach, J.M., Hagen, B.A, & Larish, J.F. (1992). Active regulation of altitude as a function 
of optical texture.  Perception & Psychophysics, 51, 557-568. 
Flach, J.M., Warren, R., Garness, S.A., Kelly, Leigh, & Stanard, T. (1997).  Perception 
and control of altitude: Splay and depression angles.  Journal of Experimental 
Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 23, 1764-1782. 
Hancock, P.A., & Manser, M.P. (1997).  Time-to-contact: More than tau alone.  
Ecological Psychology, 9, 265-297. 
Jump, M., & Padfield, G.D. (2006).  Progress in the development of guidance strategies 
for the landing flare manoeuvre using tau-based parameters.  Aircraft Engineering 
and Aerospace Technology, 78, 4-12. 




Langewiesche, W. (1972). Stick and rudder. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
Lee, D.N. (1976). A theory of the visual control of braking based on information about 
time-to-collision. Perception, 5, 437-459. 
Lee, D.N. (1980). Visuo-motor coordination in space-time.  In G.E. Stelmach & J. 
Requin (Eds.), Tutorials in motor behaviour (pp. 281-295). Amsterdam: North-
Holland. 
Lewis, C.E., & Krier, G.E. (1969). Flight research program XVI: Landing performance in 
a jet aircraft after loss of binocular vision. Aerospace Medicine, 40, 957-963. 
Lewis, C.E., Blakeley, R.W., Masters, R.L. & McMurty, T.C. (1973). Landing 
performance by low-time private pilots after the sudden loss of binocular vision – 
Cyclops II.  Aerospace Medicine, 44, 1241-1245. 
Longuet-Higgins, H.C. (1984).  The visual ambiguity of a moving plane.  Proceedings of 
the Royal Society of London B, 223, 165-175. 
Manser, M.P., & Hancock, P.A. (1996).  Influence of approach angle on estimates of 
time-to-contact.  Ecological Psychology, 8, 71-99 
McLeod, R.W., & Ross, H.E. (1983).  Optic flow and cognitive factors in time-to-
collision estimates.  Perception, 12, 417-423. 
Mertens, H.W. (1981). Perception of Runway Image Shape and Approach Angle 
Magnitude by Pilots in Simulated Night Landing Approaches. Aviation, Space, and 
Environmental Medicine, 52, 373-386. 




Mertens, H.W., & Lewis, M.F. (1982). Effect of Different Runway Sizes on Pilot 
Performance During Simulated Night Landing Approaches. Aviation, Space, and 
Environmental Medicine, 53, 463-471.  
Mulder, M., Pleijsant, J., van der Vaart, H., & van der Wieringen, P. (2000). The effects 
of pictorial detail on the timing of the landing flare: Results of a visual simulation 
experiment. The International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 10, 291-315. 
Padfield, G.D., Lee, D.N., & Bradley, R. (2003). How do helicopter pilots know when to 
stop, turn or pull up?  Journal of the American Helicopter Society, 48, 108-122.  
Pierce, B.J., & Geri, G.A. (1998). The implications of image collimation for flight 
simulator training. Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting 
Proceedings, 5, 1383-1387 
Riordan, R.H. (1974). Monocular visual cues and space perception during the approach to 
landing.  Aerospace Medicine, 45, 766-771. 
Roscoe, S.N. (1979). When the day is done and shadows fall, we miss the airport most of 
all.  Human Factors, 21, 721-731. 
Schiff, W., Oldak, R., & Shah, V. (1992). Aging persons’ estimates of vehicular motion.  
Psychology & Aging, 7, 518-525. 
Scialfa, C.T., Guzy, L.T., Leibowitz, H.W., & Garvey, P.M. (1991).  Age differences in 
estimating vehicle velocity.  Psychology & Aging, 6, 60-66. 
Sidaway, B., Fairweather, M., Sekiya, H., & McNitt-Gray, J. (1996).  Time-to-collision 
estimation in a simulated driving task.  Human Factors, 38, 101-113. 




Slack, C.W. (1953).  Some characteristics of the “Range Effect”.  Journal of 
Experimental Psychology, 46(2), 76-80. 
Smith, M. R. H., Flach, J. M., Dittman, S. M., & Stanard, T. (2001). Monocular optical 
constraints on collision control. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human 
Perception and Performance, 27, 395-410.  
Thom, T. (1994). The flying training manual: Pre-flight briefings and air exercises. 
Aviation Theory Centre, Williamstown. 
Tresilian, J.R. (1991). Empirical and theoretical issues in perception of time to contact.  
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 17, 
865-876. 
Tresilian, J.R. (1995). Perceptual and cognitive processes in time-to-contact estimation: 
Analysis of prediction-motion and relative judgment tasks. Perception & 
Psychophysics, 57, 231-245. 
Tresilian, J.R., Wallis, G.M., & Mattocks, C. (2004).  Initiation of evasive manoeuvres 
during self-motion: a test of three hypotheses.  Experimental Brain Research, 159, 
251-257. 
 






Correspondence should be addressed to Stephen Palmisano, Department of Psychology, 
University of Wollongong, Wollongong, NSW 2522, Australia. Email: 
Stephenp@uow.edu.au. The authors would like to thank Luke King and Michael Quinn 
from NSWAir and the Austalian Aerial Patrol Flight Training School for their assistance 
with this project.  We would also like to thank the reviewers for their helpful feedback, 
including the suggestion to evaluate optical splay angle.  This research was supported by 
an ATSB Aviation Safety Research Grant B2005/0119 and an ARC Discovery Grant 
DP0772398. 





 1These estimates would actually indicate the time it would take for the driver (as 
opposed to the front of the car) to reach the truck if the current speed was maintained.  
Thus, there is an assumption that the driver is able (e.g., from his/her prior experience 
with the vehicle) to adjust these TTC estimates to take into account the size of the car’s 
hood (see Tresilian, 1991). 




Table 1   
 
Five Most Commonly Selected Visual Cues 
Catergories of Visual Cues  Current Study Benbassat & Abramson (2002)  
Horizon & End of Runway 37.5 % 26.0 % 
Runway Shape & Markings 22.5 % 18.9 % 
Angle with Runway 15 % 4.1 % 
Familiar Objects 7.5 % 9.5 % 





Analysis of Variance for TTC at Flare 
Source and comparison df MSE F Cohen’s ƒ 
Group (3) 2,21 0.44 1.37 0.36 
Glideslope (2) 1,21 0.53 40.47** 1.39 
Lighting (2) 1,21 0.20 4.19 0.45 
Scene (2) 1,21 0.17 4.79* 0.48 
Group x Glideslope 2,21 0.53 4.29* 0.64 
Group x Lighting 2,21 0.20 0.39 0.19 
Group x Scene 2,21 0.17 0.33 0.18 
Glideslope x lighting 1,21 0.05 2.17 0.32 
Glideslope x Scene 1,21 0.11 2.11 0.32 
Lighting x Scene 1,21 0.04 4.62* 0.47 
Group x Glideslope x Lighting 2,21 0.05 0.21 0.14 
Group x Glideslope x Scene 2,21 0.11 1.34 0.36 
Group x Lighting x Scene 2,21 0.04 1.72 0.41 
Scene x Glideslope x Lighting 1,21 0.04 0.04 0.04 
Group x Scene x Glideslope x Lighting 2,21 0.04 0.35 0.18 
 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 





Analysis of Variance for Runway Width Angle at Flare 
Source and comparison df MSE F Cohen’s ƒ 
Group (3) 2,21 76.45 0.09 0.09 
Glideslope (2) 1,21 37.94 48.04** 1.51 
Lighting (2) 1,21 68.06 6.76* 0.57 
Scene (2) 1,21 14.72 1.53 0.27 
Group x Glideslope 2,21 37.94 5.03* 0.69 
Group x Lighting 2,21 68.06 0.64 0.25 
Group x Scene 2,21 14.72 0.02 0.03 
Glideslope x lighting 1,21 9.86 0.91 0.21 
Glideslope x Scene 1,21 19.17 1.74 0.29 
Lighting x Scene 1,21 6.40 3.75 0.42 
Group x Glideslope x Lighting 2,21 9.86 0.51 0.22 
Group x Glideslope x Scene 2,21 19.17 0.63 0.25 
Group x Lighting x Scene 2,21 6.40 0.33 0.18 
Scene x Glideslope x Lighting 1,21 10.90 0.27 0.11 
Group x Scene x Glideslope x Lighting 2,21 10.90 0.50 0.22 
 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
 




Table 4  
Analysis of Variance for Height AGL at Flare 
Source and comparison df MSE F Cohen’s ƒ 
Group (3) 2,21 2.15 0.74 0.27 
Glideslope (2) 1,21 2.83 82.73** 1.99 
Lighting (2) 1,21 1.43 3.59 0.41 
Scene (2) 1,21 1.01 4.31 0.45 
Group x Glideslope 2,21 2.83 4.80* 0.68 
Group x Lighting 2,21 1.43 0.5 0.22 
Group x Scene 2,21 1.01 0.09 0.10 
Glideslope x lighting 1,21 0.42 0.04 0.04 
Glideslope x Scene 1,21 0.58 0.42 0.14 
Lighting x Scene 1,21 0.32 4.80* 0.48 
Group x Glideslope x Lighting 2,21 0.42 0.63 0.25 
Group x Glideslope x Scene 2,21 0.58 1.28 0.35 
Group Lighting x Scene 2,21 0.32 1.48 0.37 
Scene x Glideslope x Lighting 1,21 0.31 0.25 0.11 
Group Scene x Glideslope x Lighting 2,21 0.31 0.09 0.22 
 
* p < .05.  ** p < .01. 
 





Figure 1. This figure provides a graphical representation of: (i) the (explicit) aimpoint 
(A) which was identified by a rectangular marker in all visual displays; (ii) the (implicit) 
aiming line that lies at right angles to the runway and passes through the aimpoint.  This 
figure also illustrates the several features which might be important for timing the flare.  
First, the separation LR forms the angle ψ at the observer’s eye (i.e., the angular width of 
the runway along the aiming line).  Second, the angular separations LA and RA both 
form the angle θ at the observer’s eye.  This figure also illustrates how the lexical 
feedback on the accuracy of flare timing was provided in the current study. 
 
Figure 2. Figure 2A shows the isotropic pattern of optical expansion produced during 
perpendicular approach along a straight line towards a frontoparallel surface.  This is 
represented as a purely vertical approach – with the camera pointed straight down - 
towards the rectangular runway lying on the horizontal ground plane and surrounded by 
3-D buildings. Conversely, Figure 2B shows the asymmetric pattern of optic expansion 
produced by a 6° slanted landing approach in the same environment. Each figure was 
created by taking two pictures at different stages of the descent and then superimposing 
them.  An explicit aimpoint marker is visible in each figure, located at the centre of the 
runway. White arrows indicate the change in position of selected runway lights from one 
snapshot to the next. In Figure 2A, the rate of optical expansion is the same for lights 
which lie above and below the aimpoint. In Figure 2B, the rate of optical expansion is 
clearly greater for nearer lights which lie below the aimpoint than for farther lights which 
lie above this point. 





Figure 3. Examples of the day lighting stimuli (no buildings and buildings) used in this 
experiment.  The size of explicit aimpoint has been increased to aid in the viewing of 
these images.  
 
Figure 4. Cues employed during the landing flare as rated by private and student pilots. 
 
Figure 5. Effects of group type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) and glideslope 
(3° or 6°) on flare timing error (s). A negative flare timing error means that the 
participant responded before the actual time-to-contact (TTC) reached 2 s.  Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
Figure 6. Effects of scene type (no buildings or buildings) and lighting type (day or 
night) on flare timing error (s). A negative flare timing error means that the participant 
responded before the actual TTC reached 2 s.  Error bars represent the standard error of 
the mean.  
 
Figure 7. Effects of group type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) and glideslope 
(3° or 6°) on the visual runway width angle (Ψ) at flare initiation. The appropriate 
runway width angle for a critical 2 s TTC was 23.5°. Error bars represent the standard 
error of the mean. 
 




Figure 8. Effects of group type (non-pilot, student pilot or private pilot) and glideslope 
(3° or 6°) on the height above ground level (AGL) at flare initiation. The two critical 
heights for a 2 s TTC were 3.8 m for a 3° approach and 7.5 m for a 6° approach. Error 
bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
 
Figure 9. Effects of glideslope (3° or 6°) on the runway splay angle at flare initiation. The 
two critical splay angles for a 2 s TTC were 75.8° for a 3° approach and 63.4° for a 6° 
approach. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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